ABSTRACT In cloud computing, data owners host their data on cloud servers, and users (data consumers) can access the data from the cloud servers. This new paradigm of data hosting service also introduces new security challenges that require an independent auditing service to check the integrity of the data in the cloud. Some existing methods for checking the integrity of the data cannot handle this problem efficiently and they cannot deal with the error condition. Thus, a secure and efficient dynamic auditing protocol should reject requests that are made with improper authentication. In addition, an excellent remote data authentication method should be able to collect information for statistical analysis, such as validation results. In this paper, first we design an auditing framework for cloud storage systems and propose an efficient and privacypreserving auditing protocol. Then, we extend our auditing protocol to support dynamic data operations, which is efficient and has been proven to be secure in the random oracle model. We extended our auditing protocol further to support bidirectional authentication and statistical analysis. In addition, we use a better load distribution strategy, which greatly reduces the computational overhead of the client. Last, we provide an error response scheme, and our experiments show that our solution has good error-handling ability and offers lower overhead expenses for computation and communication than other approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, with the development of computer science and technology and computer network, Internet of things, cloud computing [1] - [5] which has very high scalability and availability quickly has become the focus of extensive research attention in academia and industry.
Once cloud computing concept was proposed, it is welcomed by the major IT companies because of the outstanding advantages of low cost and high efficiency. And after a period of development, cloud computing has shown unparalleled advantages. There is no doubt that cloud computing is the future of computing trend of development. Naturally, many large enterprises became interested in cloud computing, and the storage of data and information in the cloud is of great interest to major companies because it allows data owners to move data from their local computing systems to the cloud. Because of convenience and efficiency, the popularity of cloud storage has increased rapidly. Ordinary users as well as many large firms tend to outsource their data to save their own storage space. Some small companies choose to store their data in the cloud because of the high cost of dedicated storage facilities [6] . Unfortunately, this new paradigm of data hosting service also has introduced new security challenges [7] . In addition, how to retrieve the encrypted file is also an important problem [8] - [10] .
The Data Owner(s) would worry that the data could be tampered (or deleted) in the cloud. They have this concern because they know that data can be lost in any infrastructure, irrespective of the extent of reliable measures to prevent this from happening [11] . In addition, sometimes cloud service providers may be dishonest. The server may discard some file blocks that have not been accessed or rarely accessed to save storage space and claim that all of the files are still intact. Gradually, the security of files has become a big problem in the field of cloud storage. Users are beginning to worry about the security of their files. The companies that provide cloud computing services are aware of this, and they understand that their businesses will collapse without reliable security. There are many examples that show that this can be a serious issue, e.g., Amazons S3 breakdown, Gmails mass deletion of emails, the Sidekick cloud disaster, and Amazons EC2 services outage. As a result, the Data Owners must have a mechanism to confirm whether their files are in good condition on the server.
Many Remote Data Audit (RDA) protocols, which can efficiently, securely and exactly validate the proof of data possession by generating a random challenge [12] - [14] , have been proposed by scholars in the field to solve the problem of checking the integrity of the data. The original version consists of only two entities,i.e., the server and the client. First, client calculates the Tag of each file block, uploads the file and deletes local backup. Second, the client generates a challenge sequence and sends it to the server. Third, the server computes the proof of data possession, a procedure that generally has been accepted. Through the continuous efforts of numerous scholars, many new schemes have been proposed. In order to meet the actual needs, dynamic operation was proposed and implemented. Later, in order to provide the function of the third-party validation, a third entity was added into the system model, i.e., the Third-Party Auditor.
We propose an efficient remote data auditing method for securing the storage of big data in cloud computing. In addition to third-party verification, dynamic operation, and other functions, we also considered some other aspects, as discussed below.
First, how can the computational load be allocated optimally? It is easy for the fixed allocation policy to encounter a bottleneck under certain conditions. As is well known, the servers computing power is far greater than that of the client. But does this mean that the server will take on most of the computational load? This is a question that is worth discussing, because one server often is required to provide services to many users. Thus, it became apparent that the fixed load distribution was not scientific. So, we took the more flexible approach of dynamic allocation.
It also is important to discuss third party verification. Assume that Company A stored its data on Server C and that some of the files were discarded by C. Company B, a competitor of Company A, discovered the loss of the files by third party verification, and B can attack A at this point. Clearly, this is not the result that A wanted to see. So, a mechanism is needed to reject the validation request from unrelated people. In other words, the system only should allow access to jurisdiction users. There are two reasons for this, i.e., to protect the rights of the data owner and to reduce the servers load. In order to make this idea a reality, we added a fourth entity to the system model, which is used to assign the privilege key. In addition to this, the new entity also can collect authentication information. This means that we can collect all the validation results for the data analysis in order to get more information. Also, once we have an absolutely reliable data collection agency, we no longer will need to assume that each validation party is trusted. This is because we can judge the credibility of a third party through the data collection agency.
We also discuss the problem of error localization. In this field, the actions that should be taken after the data integrity validation fails is an important issue. At this time, the Data Owner usually has to give up all of the files. But if the position of the error can be found, the data owner can keep the rest of the data. Note that the precise positioning often implies a large amount of computational overhead. However, this is often not necessary, because the Data Owner can abandon this part of the data if the error occurred in an unimportant location. So, the fixed precision of the search is not flexible, and our positioning mechanism is designed to continuously improve the accuracy of the search until it meets the requirements. At the same time, in order to further reduce the computational overhead, we used the verification sequence reuse strategy in this paper.
Specifically, our original contributions can be summarized as follows: 1) We motivated the public system of auditing the security of the data stored in cloud computing and provided a privacy-preserving auditing protocol. Our scheme enables an external auditor to audit users cloud data without learning the content of the data. 2) We extended our scheme so that it can efficiently support dynamic update operations. In order to make processing more efficient, the calculations of the client account for only a very small part of the total amount of calculation. Also, if the server becomes a bottleneck that precludes improving the efficiency, the server can transfer a part of required computations to the client. 3) We presented a new entity in the system model, i.e., The Common Platform. In the previous model, we always assumed that the Third-Party Auditor was fully trusted, but this assumption is unrealistic. The Common Platform can authorize the verification party, collect validation results, and supervise the Third-Party Auditor. 4) We proposed a scheme to locate errors. When the file is changed, the Data Owner can check to determine whether the important parts are in good condition. Further, the Data Owner can roughly determine the location of the error, thereby protecting the data that has not been changed. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the related work in this field. Section III introduces the analysis of the problem. In Section IV, we define the system model and present our scheme. In Section V, we give the experimental results, the analyses, and evaluation. Our conclusions are given in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Ateniese et al. [14] were the first to consider remote data audits in their ąśprovable data possession (PDP)ąśmodel. They utilized the RSA-based homomorphic linear authenticators and randomly sampling a few blocks of the file, thereby achieving the ability to have public audits. They showed that Third-Party Auditor(TPA) can detect Cloud Service Provider(CSP) misbehavior with a certain probability by asking proof for a constant amount of blocks that are independent of the total number of file blocks. And this conclusion gives the probabilistic proof technique a theoretical basis. However, their schemes did not consider dynamic updates. Erway et al. [15] proposed a challenge-response protocol to solve this problem. Later, many other authors in this field also proposed their own solutions [16] - [18] .
Relatively speaking, solutions have been discussed in previous papers, but [18] was not suitable for big data and batch processing because the computations of those schemes were too large. Some new tag calculation methods [18] , [19] have been proposed in order to reduce the amount of computation. In addition to these problems, Zhu et al. [20] discussed the problem of multi-cloud storage in their paper. Briefly, multicloud storage is when different parts of a file are stored on different servers. They divided the system into three layers, i.e., the storage layer, service layer, and express layer. All service providers are regarded as an aggregation through the three-layer mapping. Later, many authors solved this problem in a similar way. Perhaps inspired by the multi-cloud, some people began to pay attention to the problem of multiple owners. Wang et al. [17] used a bilinear aggregate signature scheme [21] to solve this problem. It can aggregate several different signatures into a short signature, thereby reducing both the amount of computation and the amount of communication.
In addition to PDP, Juels and Kaliski [22] defined another RDA technique based on sentinel, namely, proof of retrievability(POR). Its basic idea is to insert a sentinel in the file, and TPA asks the server to return to these random sentries. Because this scheme uses the error correcting code, the file can be recovered. But it also has its disadvantages in that each challenge consumes a sentry, and there is no update mechanism, so the verification times are limited. Also, the usage of space is increased by about 15% because of the sentinel and error-correcting code.
Wang et al. [17] used a tree structure to store files. The tree structure is more conducive to document validation and data update than the array structure. After the tree structure is used to verify the integrity of the data, some people aim to study how to improve the efficiency of the algorithm. Liu et al. [23] proposed the rank-based Merkle Hash Tree(RMHT) to improve the utilization efficiency of MHT [31] . Another way to do this is to improve the balance of the tree. However, such schemes will cause the auditor to incur high computational costs, especially for large-scale files, because the verification party must calculate the whole tree according to the path.
Sookhak et al. [24] proposed a new and efficient scheme to adapt to the era of big data. They created the following new data structure: Divide and Conquer Table(DCT) to perform dynamic update operations efficiently. DCT successfully improved the efficiency of insertion and deletion. However, if the file is frequently modified (especially the insertion operation), DCT continues to grow, thereby reducing the efficiency.
In general, the data auditing methods assume that the data owners secret key is secure. But, in fact, this is not necessarily correct. Jia et al. [25] proposed an auditing method to mitigate the damage of the data owners key exposure issue, in which the secret key of the data owner is updated by using the binary tree structure and the pre-order traversal technique.
Sookhak et al. [26] , [27] summarized the existing methods, presented their own views, and pointed out the open issues.
In addition, with the rise of the Internet of things [28] - [30] , many scholars begin to pay attention to the application of RDA in resource constrained devices.
III. PROBLEM ANALYSIS A. PROBLEM ANALYSIS 1) PUBLIC VERIFICATION
In addition to the verification of the integrity of the data, most of the current PDP and POR schemes can support thirdparty verification (public verification). In such schemes, there are three participating parties, i.e., the Data Owner, CSP, and TPA. The characteristic of this structure is that CSP is not sensitive to the identity of the authentication party. In fact, many times, that is not what we want to see. We know that both CSP and TPA are only semi-trusted by the Data Owner. Because CSP is semi-trusted, we have the RDA protocol. But the conventional three-entity structure cannot solve the problem of the third partys being semi-trusted. Because, in the old structure, the challenge message is very simple so that everyone can send one to the CSP, and the CSP cannot verify the identity of the challenge sender. Under this mechanism, the adversary can either get the related information about the Data Owners file(s) or can gather statistical information about the CSPs service status. To this end, traditional PDP models cannot quite meet the security requirements of auditing-as-aservice, even though they support public verifiability.
2) COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD ALLOCATION
In order to ensure the security and accuracy of verification, most of the existing RDA schemes verification party carries a considerable portion of the computational load. But, in general, the computing power of the server is much stronger than that of a PC. So, it is better to let the server to carry the computational overhead as much as possible, under the premise of ensuring safety. In reality, this is a win-win choice. For users, this reduces the waiting time and improves the running speed of the entire process. Usually, this is the most important aspect to the user after security. CSPs, especially for some large enterprises, can improve the running speed of the entire protocol by improving their hardware performance. This means that they can take the initiative to enhance the quality of service. And this can usually help them attract more customers.
But a situation exists, especially for small businesses, in which the servers computing power becomes the bottleneck that adversely impacts the speed of the entire protocol due to the huge number of users. So, it is difficult for the fixed-load allocation strategy to meet demand at all times, even though the server has very powerful computing power.
Accordingly, we propose the dynamic allocation concept in which, by default, the server will calculate the vast majority of the computational overhead. At the same time, the server can transfer part of the computation overhead to the verification party.
Note that this requires very high flexibility in the calculation of proof.
3) ERROR HANDLING
In this field, handling errors has become a difficult problem, and it has attracted the attention of many researchers.
Imagine that one user finds that her or his files are corrupted when they are checked. How to deal with these documents has become a serious problem. The user can delete all of the files if they are not important. But what should be done if there is some sensitive (or important) information in these files? Can we try to protect these sensitive data?
In addition, situations can occur in which users find errors when they are checking a huge file. Regardless of whether it is an important dataset, deleting the entire document would be a huge loss to the user.
In these two cases, the problems become much simpler if we are able to determine the location of the error. So this problem is worth studying.
B. OUR DESIGN GOALS
Our design goals can be summarized as the following:
• Public auditability to assure the correctness of storage:
to allow anyone, not just the clients who originally stored the file on cloud servers, to have the capability of verifying the correctness of the stored data on demand.
• Dynamic data operation support: to allow the clients to perform block-level operations on the data files while maintaining the same level of assurance concerning the correctness of the data The design should be as efficient as possible to ensure the seamless integration of public auditability and dynamic data operation support.
• Low computation complexity: to allow TPAs to perform auditing with minimum communication and computation overhead. But if the server becomes the bottleneck of the calculation process, it can transfer a part of the calculation load to the verification party proactively.
• Bidirectional verification: to allow CSPs to verify the identity of TPA and reject some authentication requests from the illegal uses.
• Error handling: to allow TPAs to collect error information and upload it to the official server; also, the server is asked to have the ability to identify the authenticity of the information. Further, TPAs can revalidate the important file blocks based on the last validation.
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEMES A. PRELIMINARIES 1) BILINEAR
Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. And let g 1 , g 2 be generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. In addition, there are three properties for the bilinear map e:
, and a, b ∈ Z p , Z p represents the set of prime numbers:
In the validation phase, an important problem is how to quickly find the relevant nodes and extract the file. The traditional array structure generates a large number of unnecessary data movements, resulting in reduced efficiency when dynamic operation is performed (especially for insertion and deletion). However, the efficiency of node lookup is very low in the traditional tree structure. In order to be able to solve these problems, we propose a new tree structure, and its main points are as follows:
• Internal node storage path information, the number of leaf nodes of its left subtree;
• Leaf node storage file block, orderly. That is, the first leaf node stores the first file block, and so on;
• Root node extra storage file information, including filename, number of blocks and some other information; Here is a simple example of Index-Tree: The Index-Tree solves the problem of node look up, and it has very strong compatibility with the dynamic operation.
In this paper, we also introduce how it works when we introduce dynamic operation.
B. SYSTEM MODEL
In our scheme, we divide all the participating entities into four parts, as illustrated in Fig. 2 (The light gray arrow represents the flow of data, and the light blue arrows represent the flow of secure messages).
Data Owner, as the client of this authentication system, needs to store a large number of files on the cloud server and needs to verify those files sometimes. The Cloud Service Provider(CSP), as the server of this authentication system, provides the storage service to its users and provides an interface for the verification request. Third-Party Auditor(TPA), as the main validation request sponsor, which sometimes can be the user, has the expertise and capabilities that cloud users do not have and has not been fully trusted. Typically, the TPA only can verify the file and cannot get any information about the file. The Common Platform(TCP) is a new entity mentioned in this solution. Unlike the TPA, it is fully trusted and transparent. Due to the presence of the platform, the CSP can verify the TPAs authority, so as to achieve the purpose of bidirectional verification In addition the common platform also will record the validation information each time. This initiative will be able to match the TPAs with their validation requests. This means that the TPAs cannot provide false validation results, because a TPA who provides false information can be located by the records.
C. THE PROPOSED SCHEME After a series of attempts and summaries, we put forward our own solution as follow:
The first step is to generate the key. First, the client generates one pair of keys using some of the parameters. And this pair of keys will be used for the signature and decryption of the file. Through the encryption/decryption operation and some other measures, the server can tell which users/TPAs are real users/TPAs (i.e., the ones that have the right to receive service). Then the client generates a second pair of keys. This pair of keys is used to generate the file block identifier. Depending on the identity, the verification party can determine whether the file has been changed.
And the algorithm (Algorithm 1) is described as follows:
record the public key set : {spk, v} 5: record the private key set : {ssk, α}
After generating the keys, the user must make a digital signature for the files that are to be uploaded. (The filename should be unique.)
In addition, the user also must divide the file into smaller blocks. Then, he or she should generate a tag for each file block.
The SigTagGen algorithm (Algorithm 2) is described as follows:
When the tags of each file block have been calculated, the user sends them and the file blocks to the CSP and then deletes the local backup (blockless verification). Now, the setting process is over.
At the beginning of the validation phase, the parties must ensure that they are qualified. In order to obtain the appropriate permissions, the verification party (the TPA or user) should register her or his own identity. Simultaneously, in this program, we use a trusted public platform to process failure to enroll 7: else ans == false 8: recover spk with sk i 9: end if Through the above process, we can know that the public platform verify the identity of the third party and give the spk to the third party. And in the next stage, spk is a key point in the intercommunication between TPA and CSP.
As mentioned above, the TPA must interact with the CSP to prove its identity before presenting verification requirements. After that, the TPA should generate the validation sequence and send it to the server.
A description of the Challenge algorithm (Algorithm 4) is provided below:
In this program, n ensures that the generated random index is within the valid range; v i ensures that; T ensures that the TPA was successfully registered and specifies an effective time range to avoid replay and other attacks.
On the CSP side, when, and only when, the T is successfully verified, the server will compute the proof.
For the detailed content, see algorithm 5: It is worth noting that
vi in the process of calculating proof . The reason for this is to transfer the computational overhead to the server. Meanwhile, this action can also prevent the server using the previous data to deceive the authenticator. Under these conditions, the computational overhead proportion of the server is maximized. In general, this is what we want to see (Algorithm 5 and 6 describe the calculation process under such conditions). But as we mentioned before, the server can also take the initiative to transfer the calculated load to the validation party.
Algorithm 5 GenProof
waiting for a request of verifiers
find the corresponding s in the database 4: if found then 5: send it to the verifier 6: else not found 7: reject the request and start the next iteration 8: end if 9: waiting for the subsequent request of verifiers 10: verify the correctness of T
11:
if correct then 12: compute : µ = c i=1 v i m i , 13 :
send proof = {µ, σ, δ, H (m c )} to the verifier 16: else error 17: reject the request and start the next iteration 18: end if 19: cache data 20: further validation 21: waiting for the next processing 22: end while
The specific proposal is that CSP only calculates µ and σ , no longer calculates the value of δ(or only calculates a port of δ) and sent H (m) and transfer request to verification party. Because both sides know the value of v i , so the verification party can calculate it if they know H (m).
Note that these computational overhead is very large because there are many exponent arithmetic of Prime-Order Bilinear Groups. After receiving the proof , the verification side using algorithm 6 to carry out the final verification.
As described in the algorithm, if the program returns true, TPA thinks the file is intact. Instead, TPA has good reason to suspect that the file is corrupt.
One point that must be mentioned is that the server can detect illegal system users and reject their service request through algorithm 5 and algorithm 6. And this is the ''bidirectional authentication'' we mentioned before.
In actuality, those are all of the basic solutions. In the next subsection, we describe an extension function, i.e., further validation.
D. ERROR HANDLING AND FURTHER VALIDATION
Of course, when the validation is successful, we believe that the users files are well preserved in the server. But when the verification is unsuccessful, the validation party should be able to obtain more information than the file error.
For practice, when Alice learned that her file was wrong, she wanted to know if an error existed in the important file blocks and when it occurred.
For this aspect, we have made the following extensions to our scheme:
1) FURTHER VALIDATION
In our scheme, if the verification fails, the verification party can continue to initiate further validation to obtain some of the results he or she would like to know.
We assume that a situation occurs in which there are some important blocks in the clients files. And if the verifier can ensure that the important files have not been changed, the results of the validation are acceptable.
We have improved our scheme so that this can be done. First, we propose a more efficient version.
After the validation fails, the verification party must regenerate the verification sequence, and, in the process of doing so, he or she must pay attention to the following points:
• The scope of the generated sequence is no longer the entire block set, but the important block set;
• Continue to use the old tags and masks which are corresponding to the important set;
• Regenerate the remaining tags and masks to reach a certain amount.
After the new verification sequence is generated, the verification party sent a new authentication to the server. Then, the server generates a new proof like last time, to verify whether the important blocks had been changed.Because some tags have been calculated before, so this time the calculate load is smaller than the previous one. But the concrete level should be judged according to the actual situation. Overall speaking, in the case of the length of challenge sequence is constant, the bigger the file, the less obvious the effect.
Although this approach improves the efficiency, there is still a problem, i.e., the server may be aware that the second block set is the important file. Although it does not know what the specific content is, the server can recognize that these documents are unusual. Generally speaking, this is not what the user wants to see.
So, here is the updated version. First, the verification party should generate some extra verification sequences, and the requirement is unchanged. The number of extra verification sequences depends on the proportion of important blocks. For example, if the important blocks accounted for 25% of the total, the data owner must generate three additional sequences.
Note that one of the sequences is used to verify the important block set, and the others are used to verify the unimportant sets. Then, the server calculates the proofs of the challenge sequences and sends them to the verification party. Then, the verification party can determine whether the important blocks have been changed. In order to reduce the computational load, it is not necessary for the authenticator to verify all proofs. The only thing he or she must do is to verify the proof of the important blocks. Of course, if the important blocks are in good condition, the user will think that the file has not been changed (even though it has been changed).
2) ERROR LOCATING
Based on the description above, we know that the verification party can check whether errors occurred in the important blocks. Further, the verification party can determine roughly where the error occurred, so as to protect the users files.
Accordingly, we continue to expand our scheme. Combined with the previous program, we can verify the location of the error by the challenge sequences that were used to hide the information in the important blocks. And now, we give a complete description of the algorithm (Algorithm 7). A detailed analysis of further validation is presented in Section 5.
Algorithm 7 ErrorLoc

E. DYNAMIC UPDATE
Dynamic updating of data is an essential feature of the data auditing methods. It allows data owner to update their outsourced file without downloading the file. Our solution also supports this feature.
As mentioned earlier, servers store their files by using an Index-Tree (Details are provided in Fig. 1.) FIGURE 1. An example of an index-tree FIGURE 2. System model.
1) DATA INSERT
We start from 'data insert', which is the most basic operation. The features of 'data append' and 'data modify' are based on 'data insert'.
Data insertion (as well as other dynamic operations) must be conducted in the form of a block. This allows the data owner to insert a new data block in the original file.
Assume that the user wants to insert a new file block: m after the ith block: m i .
Initially, the client should recompute the signature: s and tag: σ . In addition, the client must compute the Insertion position. Then, the client should send a modified request to the server using the following request format: update = {λ, s , σ , m , pos} and λ = insert, where pos denotes the insertion point. and λ denotes the type of request. After receiving the update request, the server gets T = time||version by restoring the signature: s. Once the signature is restored, the server considers the source of the request as a legitimate user because only the source user has the key: ssk that can generate a signature. The server can determine whether it is an expired request(due to network congestion or other reasons) by time and prevent replay attack by version (the version number can be regarded as a sequence). After successful verification, the server updates s = s and find the location of pos. Last, the server updates Index-Tree, and adds the file block and tag.
The schematic diagram of the procedure follows: 
2) DATA APPEND
The append operation allows the data owner to insert a new data block at the end of the file. In fact, this operation can be seen as a simplified version of data insertion. Just like data insert, the client should recompute the signature: s and tag: σ . But the update request should be: update = {λ, s , σ , m } and λ = append. On the other side, server also verify the T first. In fact, server is always the case. Then, server update s = s and update data on the last leaf node of Index-Tree. 
3) DATA MODIFY
Data modify is the dynamic operation that is most commonly used. It allows the data owner to update the outsourced file by altering one or more blocks without having to download all of the blocks. To modify the ith block, the user should select the file(s) to be modified and compute the new tag(s): s and signature s. Then, the data owner need sent the request: update = {λ, s , σ , m , pos} and λ = modify to the server. The server must identify the corresponding file block(s) when it receives and verifies the update message. Then, the old blocks and tags are replaced by the new block(s) and tag(s).
4) DATA DELETE
When he or she feels that some of the files are useless or outdated, the data owner can ask the server to delete some block(s). There are many reasons for this, and servers may charge for their services or some invalid files may have an impact on the user. Briefly, the user need to send update = {λ, s , pos} and λ = delete to the server when he wants to delete something. Relative to other update operations, the server side only needs to verify the identity, and delete the corresponding block(s). 
5) SUMMARY
Dynamic operation is an important part of RDA, and the following is a summary of the algorithm (Algorithm 8) for the dynamic operation phase.
F. INFORMATION GATHERING
In practice, the data owner may want to know the validation records of her or his files. By checking the record, the data owners can observe the storage status of their files and get more information about their files. In another sense, the detection state is treated as a detection curve, not a few isolated monitoring points.
In our model, one of the tasks of the The Common Platform is to collect the validation data. And the specific method is that, at the end of verification, the verification party must send the verification results to The Common Platform. Then, The Common Platform collects these data and associates the results with the corresponding verifiers.
In fact, the whole process is divided into two steps. First, the verifier send related information:{info||Sig ski (info)|| E spk (result||sequences||masks)||time} to TCP. And the next step: TCP determines the corresponding ski according to info from database and verifies the authenticity of info through ski and Sig ski (info). If the authentication is executed successfully, TCP put this information into the database. If it does not execute successfully, this request will be rejected.
V. EVALUATION
Before we start at this stage, we need to look at the whole scheme. And the following table (TABLE 1) describes the whole process of our scheme:
A. SECURITY ANALYSIS 1) CORRECTNESS ANALYSIS First, we will prove the correctness of our scheme. In the validation phase, we give our verification formula (see Algorithm 6) .
Note that the meaning of the symbols used in the above proof procedure are based on the description of Algorithm 6.
2) DETECTION PROBABILITY
As mentioned above, our scheme is based on PDP. And the core philosophy of PDP is "sampling". So our scheme has two important advantages:
• It greatly reduces the computational overhead;
• It has a high probability of detecting any misbehaviors of the server. Now, we will analyze the probabilistic guarantees of-fered by a scheme that supports block sampling.
Assume that a user stores a file F on the server, and this file is divided into n blocks. Let c be the length of the query sequence(the number of blocks in a challenge). And X represents the discrete random variable that indicates the number of blocks chosen by the verifier(Data Owner Or TPA) that matches the modified blocks by the CSP.
We verify the reliability of the entire scheme by calculating P x (the probability that at least one of the blocks picked by verifier matches one of the blocks deleted by CSP). if version == version + 1 then 9: get λ from update request 10: if λ == insert then 11: find the predetermined position : pos 12: insert new file block : m 13: update nodes participating along the path 14: else if λ == append then 15: insert new file block : m 16: update nodes participating along the path 17: else if λ == modify then 18: find the predetermined position : pos 19: replace m with m 20: else if λ == delete then 21: find the predetermined position : pos 22: delete the block 23: update nodes participating along the path 24: end if 25: replace s with s 26: send a complete signal to the client 27: end if 28: end if Now we have:
By the above formula, we can get the following results (independent variables are c and t, dependent variable is P X and n = 15000):
The data in the above two pictures are the same, but the angles are different. To summarize, if t = 1% of n, then 
FIGURE 7. Detection probability (I).
the verifier asks for 460 blocks and 300 blocks in order to achieve Px values of at least 99% and 95%, respectively. The experimental results are as follows (n = 12500, t = 125): 
3) AVAILABLE INFORMATION OF CSP
For further validation, we propose several different security levels. For CSP, the additional information that can be obtained at different levels of security is also different.
If the DataOwner only sent the challenge sequence of important blocks, CSP just computes the proof of this part. And CSP may think that this part of the data is special. In other words, CSP can learn the location and the approximate number of important blocks.
And if the DataOwner sent some extra challenge sequences, CSP's calculation process will involve all of the file blocks. But because every sequence is independent, CSP still has the potential to learn something.
For instance, CSP receives five challenge sequences. Given this situation, the only thing CSP can learn is that the proportion of important documents may be 20%. But, for CSP, the reliability of this information is very low. Because the DataOwner can control the number of challenge sequences to confuse CSP. In addition, there may not be any important documents at all. The purpose of the DataOwner is just to get the wrong location, not to check the important documents. So CSP cannot learn the number of important blocks.
Meanwhile, CSP cannot learn the position, either. The probability that CSP could find the real important sequence is not higher than the probability of a randomly-selected file block is important. We have every reason to believe that this method is secure.
Note that the important blocks are often gathered together.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
We now report some performance results of our experiments. We assumed that our auditing mechanism occurred between a dedicated TPA and some cloud storage node to which the users data have been outsourced. In our experiment, both sides (CSP and TPA/DataOwner) are implemented on a workstation with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3230M processor running at 2.60 GHz with 4096 MB of RAM. All algorithms were written in Java language. Our code uses Java Pairing-Based Cryptography(JPBC), library version 2.0.0. All experimental results represent the mean of 20 trials.
1) VALIDATION OVERHEAD
As mentioned before, we used a dynamic allocation strategy. In order to fully reflect the performance of our method, we made a comparison between our scheme (default state) and Wang's scheme [17] in Fig. 9 . We can see that our scheme's total computational overhead was close to Wang's. But the allocation strategy is vastly different. By way of contrast, our scheme's server overhead increased by 58.8%, but the clients overhead decreased by 96.3%. Generally speaking, this allocation scheme is more scientific.
Note that our scheme allows the CSP to transfer computational overhead to the verification party to reach a similar allocation proportion of Wang's scheme. But Wang's scheme cannot do this because he used the MHT storage structure, and TPA/DO must calculate the value of the root node. And that this allocation method is more suitable for resource constrained devices [32] , [33] .
2) HANDLING ERRORS
The discussion in Section 4.4.2 gave an additional validation scheme. In order to reduce the overhead, we took a tag-reuse strategy. But this approach will result in a change in the probability of detection. So, now, we can begin our analysis with this problem.
Note that c = c 1 + c 2 , n = n 1 + n 2 , t = t 1 + t 2 . In order to highlight the difference between P X and P X , we define a variable P:
For a file which has 12,000 normal blocks, 3000 important blocks, our experimental results are as follows (Fig. 10) :
(Assume that t = 1% of n, c=460, and all experiments in this section are based on this dataset.) (Because the value is small, the graph exhibits a jump phenomenon.)
From the above experimental data, we can find that the change of detection probability is very small. This indicated that our scheme was feasible. Next, we used an experiment to justify the efficiency of our scheme. Let's address the security level first. For CSP, there are two situations, i.e., 1) to allow CSP to know the location of important blocks and 2) not to allow CSP to know the location of the important blocks. Meanwhile, there also are two situations for the DataOwner, i.e., 1) the DataOwner only checks the important proof and 2) the DataOwner checks all proofs to keep more blocks. Now, we give the experimental results ( Fig. 11) : Note that Case 1 is a normal verification, Case 2 is the situation that allows the CSP to know the location of important blocks, and Case 3 is the situation that does not allow the CSP to know the location of important blocks.
The experimental results indicate that our scheme is very efficient when it is used only to verify important blocks.
And if the DataOwner want to keep 90% of the blocks in his or her file, he or she would have to pay an extra 360% of the computational overhead. And, for CSP, if the DataOwner want to discard unimportant files, only 84% overhead of normal verification is required to determine the integrity of the important blocks. If the DataOwner doesn't want it, CSP must make a lot of calculations for the confidentiality of important blocks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new, remote data-auditing system that supports bi-directional verification and further validation for data storage security in cloud computing. We utilized a new entity to generate the authoritys credential, so we no longer have to assume that every TPA is credible. Meanwhile, CSPs can verify the authority of the verification party and reject requests that come from unauthorized users. Considering that the computing power of the CSP is far greater than that of the PC, we optimized the allocation of computational overhead and greatly reduced the computational overhead of the client. Of course, the CSP could actively transfer computing overhead to the verification party if CSP's computing power is not sufficient to provide services to all users.
In addition, we presented an additional validation scheme to solve the problem of file errors. If there are some important blocks in the user's file, the DataOwner can check the integrity of these important blocks at less cost and CSP cannot acquire any information about the important blocks. Further, the DataOwner can learn the error position to keep the remaining files if he or she is willing to calculate some extra data.
As part of our future work, we will extend our work to explore more effective verification schemes.
From our experiments, we found that our scheme may lead to higher computational load at a higher security level, especially for large files. Also, we will explore how to further improve the efficiency of dynamic operation, and we also will improve our scheme so that it can be used for distributed cloud servers.
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